DIB: Why defence SMEs lack capital

European rearmament has filled the order books of France's defence industrial and technological base (the "BITD"). But behind the sector's unmissable major players — Thales, Naval Group, Safran, Dassault Aviation and MBDA chief among them — the roughly 4,500 small and mid-sized firms that make up the supply chain are struggling to raise the capital they need to keep pace. A paradox that threatens to slow an industrial effort that has been endorsed at the very top of the French state.
A large but little-known industrial base
The French defence industry is instinctively associated with a handful of household names. In reality, the BITD forms a much broader network: around 4,500 SMEs and mid-sized firms, most of which operate in both civilian and military markets, alongside the nine major prime contractors: Thales, Safran, Airbus Defence and Space, Dassault Aviation, Naval Group, MBDA, ArianeGroup, Arquus and KNDS.
Together, they employ around 220,000 people, directly and indirectly. These are the companies that manufacture the electronic components, composite materials and propulsion systems that, once assembled, become a tank, a frigate or a missile.
But this picture masks an even sharper imbalance. According to a sector study by consultancy IAC for Elevation Capital Partners, presented in June 2026, the nine major contractors alone capture €47.6 billion in defence-related revenue, the sector’s 450 mid-sized firms capture €9.4 billion, and its 4,050 SMEs capture just €4 billion.
Despite being 450 times more numerous than the major groups, SMEs therefore capture only around 6.5% of the sector’s total revenue (IAC for Elevation Capital Partners, June 2026), a power imbalance that explains why the financial bottleneck falls squarely on them.
Yet this industrial base is a direct beneficiary of the defence budget build-up under way for several years. France’s defence budget reached €50.5 billion, excluding pensions, in 2025, up 56% since 2017 (from €32.2 billion) (French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2025). The 2027 draft budget allocates €63.4 billion, €6.5 billion more than in 2026 (French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2026).
The updated 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM), definitively adopted by Parliament on 1 July 2026 and enacted on 16 August 2026, now provides for €436 billion over the period, targeting 2.5% of GDP for defence spending by 2030. In the longer term, France has committed with its NATO allies to raise this effort to 3.5% of GDP by 2035.
At the European level, the trend is the same and accelerating: according to the Council of the European Union, member states’ defence investment jumped 23% in 2025 to reach €134 billion, or 32% of their total defence spending, a record (Council of the EU, 2025).
Full order books, financing that hasn’t kept up
In theory, this surge in orders should be excellent news for the entire supply chain. In practice, it is creating unprecedented strain. A report presented to the French Ministry of the Economy in March 2025 estimated the increase in BITD order-book value to be absorbed by 2030 at around €17.5 billion, a volume that SMEs and mid-sized firms can only meet by investing heavily, and quickly, in their production capacity.
Yet these companies operate on long industrial cycles: several years of design, several more of military qualification and certification, followed by decades of operation and maintenance.
In adjacent sectors such as naval defence, companies commonly spend between 5% and 10% of revenue on R&D every year, a benchmark that illustrates the burden this innovation effort places on SMEs of often modest size.
On top of this come fast-growing working capital needs (each additional order to be fulfilled ties up more cash before payment is received) and structural investment (new production lines, automation, compliance upgrades) whose returns take years to materialise. In short, these companies, often family-owned, do not have the financial means to absorb such an effort on their own.
ESG self-exclusion, a bottleneck specific to this sector
Added to these structural constraints is a more specific obstacle, documented by the French Senate in its 2024 report on BITD financing: the self-exclusion practised by part of the banking sector and investment funds, which reflexively place the entire defence industry, including subcontractors that also operate in civilian markets, in the “excluded” categories of their ESG policies (Environment, Social, Governance, the three non-financial criteria used by investors and banks to assess a company beyond its financial performance alone).
The case that has become emblematic is that of a company supplying ammunition to French naval commandos, which was turned down by five of the six banks it approached for a simple building-extension project (French Senate, 2024). Yet no French or European regulation imposes such an exclusion. It stems from an interpretation of ESG criteria that banks have only recently begun to revise. According to the April 2026 government report, refusals now mainly reflect standard financial-soundness criteria.
A financing need revised upward
The exact scale of the financing need has been significantly revised within the space of a year. An initial government report, presented to the French Treasury in March 2025, estimated the BITD’s new financing needs at €5 to €7 billion by 2030, of which €1 to €3 billion in equity, with the remainder to be covered by debt and short-term financing.
A year later, an industry-government dialogue co-chaired by Hervé Guillou (former CEO of Naval Group) and Philippe Brassac (CEO of Crédit Agricole SA), whose conclusions were published in April 2026, revised this need sharply upward: between €4 and €6 billion in equity would now be required by 2030. This sum is intended to finance the ramp-up of domestic orders, the pursuit of export contracts, and investment in production capacity alike (Guillou-Brassac industry-government dialogue, April 2026).
Public authorities step in
Faced with this situation, the French state has substantially expanded its toolkit since 2018.
The Definvest fund, launched by the French defence procurement agency (DGA) and Bpifrance with an initial €50 million endowment, was created specifically to address the shortage of private financing in this segment. Its capacity was doubled to €100 million in 2022 at the request of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and it has invested nearly €70 million in around thirty companies through tickets ranging from €500,000 to €10 million (Bpifrance, 2026).
The Defence Innovation Fund (FID), launched in 2021 by the Defence Innovation Agency and Bpifrance with €220 million, has since attracted private subscribers such as Allianz France and MBDA, growing its size to €275 million against a €300 million target. It has invested around €80 million in innovative dual-use companies such as Pasqal, Quandela and Exotrail (Bpifrance, 2026).
More recently, in October 2025, Bpifrance took a further step by launching Bpifrance Défense, a fund open to retail investors for the first time: accessible from €500 through a securities account, a life insurance policy, a retirement savings plan or a PEA-PME account, it aims to raise €450 million and to invest, directly or indirectly, in more than 500 unlisted BITD companies (Bpifrance, October 2025).
In parallel, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has opened a €1 billion working-capital facility dedicated to the short-term financing and investment needs of SMEs and mid-sized firms in the sector, and Crédit Mutuel Arkéa has signed a €500 million agreement with Bpifrance designed to address this same type of need.
Unprecedented interest from private equity
This public-sector momentum has acted as a catalyst for an unprecedented wave of specialist private fund launches in the sector.
The April 2026 government report lists a substantial number of initiatives: the Eirénée fund from Weinberg Capital Partners; Tikehau Ace Aéro Partenaires 2 and Tikehau Défense et Sécurité, two Tikehau Capital funds (the latter launched with Société Générale Assurances, CNP Assurances and the CARAC group, with an initial commitment of €150 million invested in equal parts by the three insurers); and several Eurazeo funds dedicated to sovereignty (Guillou-Brassac industry-government dialogue, April 2026).
Other, smaller players have also entered this segment since, alongside Amundi, which launched a dedicated European defence ETF as early as May 2025, and Eurazeo, which has included defence and sovereignty among the four themes of its Ambition Europe 2025 fund.
The European lever: ReArm Europe and Readiness 2030
This national mobilisation is part of a broader movement across the continent. In March 2025, the European Union launched the ReArm Europe plan, since renamed Readiness 2030, aimed at mobilising up to €800 billion for Europe’s rearmament, including around €650 billion in fiscal flexibility for member states and €150 billion in loans (the SAFE instrument).
In practice, this plan relies mainly on relaxing national budget rules and on joint borrowing between member states, rather than on subsidies paid directly to SMEs.
For the French industrial base, the expected effect is indirect but real: the more numerous and predictable European defence orders are over time, the more reason private funds have to invest in the supply chain that produces them.
Useful but still insufficient tools
Despite this unprecedented mobilisation, the gap between identified needs (€4 to €6 billion in equity by 2030, according to the government report) and the amounts raised so far (€2.3 billion by 17 specialist funds, according to the same report) remains significant, even though the report considers it can be closed if ongoing fundraising succeeds. It weighs particularly on tier-2 and tier-3 SMEs (subcontractors to subcontractors), which never sign contracts directly with the state or a major prime contractor, but whose output nonetheless determines whether industrial production targets are met.
Many of these companies remain too small to attract private equity funds, which typically look for tickets of several million euros, and too thinly documented financially to reassure banks that have long been reluctant to finance a sector that ESG criteria have flagged as sensitive.
This is precisely the space that intermediate financing tools need to fill: more accessible than traditional private equity, but offering a longer horizon than short-term bank credit, so that the billions of euros in orders flowing into the BITD translate, on the ground, into factories running at full capacity, rather than into order books falling behind schedule for lack of production capacity.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the BITD?
The BITD (base industrielle et technologique de défense) is France’s defence industrial and technological base: the network of French companies that design, manufacture or maintain military equipment. It comprises nine major prime contractors (Thales, Safran, Naval Group, Dassault Aviation, MBDA, among others) and around 4,500 SME and mid-sized subcontractors, together accounting for roughly 220,000 direct and indirect jobs.
Why do banks sometimes refuse to finance defence SMEs?
Part of the banking sector and investment fund industry applies ESG policies that exclude the entire defence industry on principle, including civilian subcontractors with no direct link to controversial weapons. This practice is not required by any French or European regulation: it is a voluntary self-exclusion by financial institutions (French Senate, 2024).
How much do BITD SMEs need to fund their growth?
According to an industry-government dialogue published in April 2026, the equity needs of BITD companies are estimated at €4 to €6 billion by 2030. A study by Elevation Capital Partners (June 2026) reaches the same order of magnitude for SMEs alone, excluding innovation and business-transfer financing.
What tools exist to finance a BITD SME?
Several schemes coexist today: long-standing public funds (Definvest, the Defence Innovation Fund), the new retail-investor fund Bpifrance Défense, a wave of specialist private funds (Tikehau, Eurazeo, Weinberg Capital, among others), an EIB working-capital facility, dedicated banking agreements such as the one between Crédit Mutuel Arkéa and Bpifrance, and initial public offerings, including on markets dedicated to SMEs such as Lise.
Sources
- info.gouv.fr: press kit, BITD financing, March 2025 (€5-7bn, including €1-3bn in equity), info.gouv.fr/upload/media/content/0001/13/9e90aa4b056f3a52c7cdabd480d5146914aa0e24.pdf
- info.gouv.fr: The French Government strengthens defence industry financing (€1bn EIB facility, Eirénée fund, Ace Aero Partenaires 2, LPM at €413.3bn), info.gouv.fr/actualite/le-gouvernement-renforce-le-financement-de-lindustrie-de-defense
- Theatrum Belli: summary of the government report on BITD financing, April 2026 (€4-6bn equity need, €2.3bn raised by 17 funds, list of private funds), theatrum-belli.com/financement-de-la-bitd-rapport-gouvernemental-avril-2026
- Idéal Investisseur: Guillou-Brassac industry dialogue, April 2026 (€4-6bn equity need), ideal-investisseur.fr/eco-politique/defense-4-a-6-milliards-deuros-de-fonds-propres-manquent-a-la-bitd-dici-2030-33418.html
- France Invest: defence financing (178 companies backed out of more than 800, end-2024), franceinvest.eu/financement-de-la-defense
- JSS: Elevation Capital Partners study presented on 16 June 2026 (€4-6bn in equity for SMEs, excluding innovation and business transfer), jss.fr/post/industrie-defense-premiere-ligne-pme-recherche-financements
- French Senate: report on BITD financing, cases of bank ESG self-exclusion and the naval-commando ammunition example (2024), senat.fr/rap/l23-364/l23-3642.html
- French Senate: 2023 budget opinion, Defence Committee, French Banking Federation’s position on financing refusals, senat.fr/rap/a22-117-5/a22-117-57.html
- French Senate: update to the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law, enacted on 16 August 2026 (€436bn), senat.fr/travaux-parlementaires/textes-legislatifs/la-loi-en-clair/projet-de-loi-actualisant-la-programmation-militaire-pour-les-annees-2024-a-2030-et-portant-diverses-dispositions-interessant-la-defense.html
- Bpifrance (press): launch of the Bpifrance Défense fund, October 2025 (€450m, accessible from €500), presse.bpifrance.fr/bpifrance-lance-le-fonds-bpifrance-defense
- Bpifrance (press): Definvest and the Defence Innovation Fund, amounts and holdings, presse.bpifrance.fr/bpifrance-renforce-son-soutien-aux-entreprises-strategiques-francaises-du-secteur-de-la-defense
- French Ministry of the Armed Forces: 2026 update to the Military Programming Law (€436bn, 2.5% of GDP by 2030), defense.gouv.fr/actualites/actualisation-loi-programmation-militaire-aller-plus-vite-plus-loin
- French Ministry of the Armed Forces: 2024-2030 Military Programming Law and 2027 draft budget (€63.4bn for the Defence mission), defense.gouv.fr/ministere/politique-defense/loi-programmation-militaire-2024-2030/loi-programmation-militaire-2024-2030-grandes
- Bpifrance Le Lab: “Aux armes, dirigeants ?”, SMEs and mid-sized firms facing the defence effort, October 2025 (€15bn in financing needs), lelab.bpifrance.fr/storage/sites/31/2026/01/Aux-armes-dirigeants-PME-ETI-face-a-leffort-de-defense-Octobre-2025.pdf
- L’Essentiel de l’Éco: French banks refuse to finance defence SMEs, April 2026, lessentieldeleco.fr/6763-grand-est-quand-les-criteres-verts-bloquent-le-rearmement
- Council of the European Union: ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan (€800bn mobilisable by 2030), consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/european-defence-readiness
- Council of the European Union: EU defence in figures (€134bn in investment, +23% in 2025, 32% of total spending, €150bn SAFE instrument), consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/defence-numbers
- French Ministry of the Armed Forces: 2025 Defence Key Figures (€50.5bn excluding pensions, +56% since 2017), defense.gouv.fr — Key Figures 2025 (PDF)
- Defacto: defence financing, challenges and solutions for BITD SMEs, getdefacto.com/fr/article/financement-defense-bitd
- Eurazeo: funds page, Defence & Sovereignty theme within the Eurazeo Ambition Europe 2025 fund, wealth.eurazeo.com/fonds