Undersea cables, naval defence, offshore wind: the sea, a new strategic and industrial frontier

Undersea cables, naval programmes, offshore wind: the sea has, in just a few years, become one of the most contested arenas in the global economy and in European geopolitics. Behind the large groups leading these programmes, hundreds of specialised SMEs and mid-caps form the essential of the industrial value chain. And they are critically short of long-term capital to finance their growth.
A sector getting back into gear
For a long time, the sea was a blind spot in Western public policy: a space of free movement taken for granted, quietly maintained behind the scenes by a handful of shipping companies and discreet cable operators.
But the war in Ukraine, rising tensions with Russia and the accelerating energy transition have reshuffled the deck in barely three years. Several events, taken together, have put the sea back at the centre of the European strategic debate.
Subsea cables first. Between 2023 and 2025, around ten cables were damaged in the Baltic Sea, seven of them between November 2024 and January 2025 alone, affecting Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Germany and Lithuania.
The best-documented case remains that of the tanker Eagle S, suspected of dragging its anchor across some 90 kilometres of seabed on Christmas Day 2024, severing the EstLink 2 power cable and four telecommunications cables between Finland and Estonia (France 24, 2025). In October 2025, however, the Helsinki District Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to try the crew, as the incident occurred in Finland’s exclusive economic zone rather than in its territorial waters (Kyiv Independent, 2025).
At the time, NATO responded by announcing a stronger military presence in the area, a sign that seabed protection is now treated as a matter of collective defence rather than simply a telecoms infrastructure issue.
Naval programmes next. France passed a 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM) covering €400 billion in budget appropriations (€413.3 billion including additional resources), a 40% increase on the previous programme, intended in particular to fund the renewal of first-rank frigates, the third generation of ballistic missile submarines and the future nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, due to enter service around 2038.
An update, definitively adopted by Parliament on 1 July 2026 and enacted on 16 August 2026, added a further €36 billion for 2026-2030, bringing the total budget envelope to €436 billion and the defence spending target to 2.5% of French GDP in 2030. In the longer term, France has committed with its NATO allies to raise this effort to 3.5% of GDP by 2035.
This trend is not isolated: military spending in Europe (including Russia) jumped 14% in 2025 to $864 billion, the strongest regional increase in the world (SIPRI, 2026).
Offshore wind, finally. The third Multiannual Energy Programme (PPE3), published in February 2026, sets a target of 15 GW of installed capacity by 2035 (18 GW from 2037) and 45 GW by 2050, around 20% of French electricity consumption, making offshore wind the country’s second-largest source of electricity after nuclear. RTE alone plans around €37 billion in grid investment by 2040 to connect up to 22 GW of offshore wind farms (CRE, 2025).
Subsea cables, naval programmes, offshore wind: the sea, long seen as a space of free movement, is once again an object of competition, protection and massive investment.
An invisible artery on which the global economy depends
Almost all of the world’s data traffic travels along the ocean floor. In 2025, the global network had more than 574 commercial cables in service, with a combined length exceeding 1.4 million kilometres, carrying more than 99% of intercontinental data traffic (Sciencepost, 2025). An amendment tabled in the French National Assembly in 2023 noted that around $10 trillion in financial transactions pass through this infrastructure every day, according to the US Federal Reserve. A figure that shows what would be at stake in the event of a coordinated break at several points in the network.
Yet this infrastructure remains surprisingly fragile: it suffers on average nearly 150 faults a year worldwide, most of them accidental (anchors, trawlers, seismic activity), some suspected of being deliberate (Sciencepost, 2025).
France has a rare industrial asset here, with two major players (Orange Marine and Alcatel Submarine Networks) that together account for a significant share of the global fleet of cable ships, the specialised vessels essential for laying and repairing cables. A combination of their activities is regularly mentioned within the industry as a way to secure this industrial capacity in the face of the rise of Asian cable operators.
A build-up that feeds an entire industrial fabric
Behind the high-profile major contracts (submarines, frigates, aircraft carriers), the French naval industry forms a dense sector made up largely of SMEs. According to the French naval industry association (GICAN), the sector generated combined revenue of more than €17 billion in 2025, up 9% year on year, 70% from defence and 30% from civil markets, and now has 59,100 direct jobs, nearly 15,000 created over ten years, making it the fourth-largest net job creator in French industry (Le Journal des Entreprises, 2026).
It brings together more than 735 companies (GICAN, 2024), 57% of them SMEs and 18% very small businesses, nearly three-quarters of the sector’s business fabric. Exports regained momentum in 2025 (+9%), after a slight decline in 2024 (-9%) which itself followed two exceptional years driven by major contracts (+30% in 2023). The sector’s order intake also reached an unprecedented level, with €38 billion in new orders booked in 2025 alone (ActuNautique, 2026).
Naval Group, the sector’s most visible prime contractor, illustrates the scale of the current momentum: the company booked €18.9 billion in new orders in 2025, against €8.2 billion in 2024, bringing its total order book to €32 billion, nearly seven years of guaranteed activity (L’Essentiel de l’Éco, 2026).
This surge stems from a series of major contracts: the next-generation aircraft carrier “France Libre” (around €12.2 billion), the Orka contract with the Netherlands for four submarines derived from the Barracuda (€5.6 billion), Scorpène Evolved submarines for Indonesia (nearly €2 billion), and a fourth FDI frigate for Greece (€810 million) (L’Essentiel de l’Éco, 2026).
But each major contract of this kind mechanically triggers a cascade of orders to hundreds of specialist subcontractors in onboard electronics, propulsion, composite materials or naval cybersecurity. Companies that are much smaller, far less capitalised, yet just as essential to meeting production schedules.
Offshore wind: the fast-tracked construction of a third energy sector
France’s delay in offshore wind is clear: only 2 GW were in operation at the start of 2026, against 5.6 GW under construction or in development. This led the State to rethink its approach. The merger of two tenders, for a total capacity of around 10 GW, is set to contribute to the target of 15 GW installed by 2035, before the ramp-up to 45 GW in 2050 (French Ministry of the Economy, 2026).
The grid connection effort, for its part, is firmly quantified. In its 2025 Ten-Year Network Development Plan (SDDR), RTE estimates at €37 billion the cost of connecting 22 GW of offshore wind by 2040, or 37% of the roughly €100 billion in grid investment planned over the period (CRE, 2025).
The ports of Saint-Nazaire, Cherbourg and Brest already account for a growing share of industrial investment in this sector, which also relies on an ecosystem of SMEs specialising in foundations, subsea cabling, maintenance and robotic monitoring of wind farms.
Behind the major groups, a fabric of undercapitalised SMEs
This is where France’s ability to meet its ambitions is very concretely at stake. The French defence industrial and technological base (BITD) comprises around 4,500 SMEs and mid-sized firms, often dual-use (both civil and military), alongside nine major prime contractors (Thales, Dassault Aviation, Naval Group, Safran, MBDA...).
The equity needs of this industrial base are now estimated at €4 to €6 billion by 2030, according to the latest government “market dialogue” published in April 2026, a clear upward revision from the first 2025 estimate. The report considers that existing funds can cover this need if ongoing fundraising succeeds. SMEs’ financing difficulties stem from several structural causes, including ESG self-exclusion by part of the banking sector, documented by the French Senate (French Senate, 2024). According to the April 2026 government report, however, refusals now mainly reflect standard financial-soundness criteria.
This equity constraint is compounded by a timing constraint specific to the naval and defence sector. A naval company spends on average between 5% and 10% of its revenue on R&D each year. For an SME or small mid-sized firm with €40 to €60 million in revenue, that represents €2 to €6 million a year, on top of complex certifications and significant cash needs linked to payment terms along the subcontracting chain.
These companies operate on long industrial cycles: 3 to 5 years for design, 2 to 4 years for construction, 20 to 40 years for operation, a pace that simply does not match that of short-term bank credit. Debt plays its part, but it cannot on its own finance an industry whose profitability horizon is measured in decades.
Long-term needs, very real assets
These companies need long-term financing, matching their cycles. In return, they hold tangible assets: factories, patents, rare technological positions, often critical to France’s energy, industrial and digital sovereignty. They also operate in markets with high barriers to entry and good visibility on orders several years ahead.
The scale of what is at stake can be measured at macroeconomic level. Two sets of figures circulate on the weight of the French maritime economy, and they are not directly comparable. According to Ifremer, based on Insee data, the maritime economy accounted for €43.3 billion in value added and 525,000 jobs in 2019, the most recent data available, or 1.5% of French GDP (French Ministry for the Ecological Transition, 2024).
The French Maritime Cluster, which brings together professionals in the sector, puts forward higher figures: between €70 and €97 billion in revenue or “production value”, and 388,000 to 400,000 direct jobs depending on the statement. Its target for 2030: 1 million jobs and €150 billion in annual production value (Nouvelle Vie Pro, 2025). The two methods do not measure quite the same thing. The target set by the sector, for its part, represents a near-doubling of activity.
Such a doubling will not happen with traditional financing tools alone. Companies of this kind, profitable and strategic but with long cycles and insufficient equity, need capital markets suited to SMEs and mid-sized firms, able to provide long-term financing where bank debt reaches its limits.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why have subsea cables become a strategic issue again?
Because they carry more than 99% of intercontinental data traffic (Sciencepost, 2025), including around $10 trillion in financial transactions a day according to the US Federal Reserve, and because they are physically vulnerable: around 150 faults a year worldwide. Incidents in the Baltic Sea between 2023 and 2025, notably the Eagle S case, led NATO to strengthen its military presence in the area to protect this infrastructure.
How much does France devote to its naval and defence programmes?
The 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM), updated and enacted in August 2026, brings the total budget envelope to €436 billion, with a target of 2.5% of GDP devoted to defence in 2030. The French naval industry (GICAN) alone generated more than €17 billion in combined revenue in 2025 (Le Journal des Entreprises, 2026).
What are France’s offshore wind targets?
The PPE3, published in February 2026, sets a target of 15 GW of installed capacity by 2035 (18 GW from 2037), then 45 GW by 2050, around 20% of French electricity consumption. RTE plans around €37 billion in grid investment by 2040 to connect these wind farms (CRE, 2025).
Why do SMEs in these sectors lack capital?
They operate on very long industrial cycles, with up to several decades of operation, must devote a significant share of their revenue to R&D, and face ESG self-exclusion by part of the banking sector, which classifies the entire defence industry as “excluded” without any regulatory obligation to do so (French Senate, 2024). According to the government, however, refusals now mainly reflect standard financial-soundness criteria. The equity needs of the defence industrial base alone are estimated at €4 to €6 billion by 2030.
Sources
- Sciencepost: 1.4 million kilometres of cables line the ocean floor (TeleGeography/ICPC, 574 cables, 99% of intercontinental traffic, 150 faults/year), sciencepost.fr/14-million-de-kilometres-de-cables-tapissent-le-fond-des-oceans
- Kyiv Independent: Finnish court drops case against Eagle S crew for lack of jurisdiction (October 2025), kyivindependent.com/finland-court-drops-case-against-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-crew
- SIPRI: press release, world military expenditure 2025 (Europe: $864bn, +14%), sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026 Milex PR FRE.pdf
- French Senate: update to the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law, enacted on 16 August 2026 (€436bn), senat.fr/travaux-parlementaires/textes-legislatifs/la-loi-en-clair/projet-de-loi-actualisant-la-programmation-militaire-pour-les-annees-2024-a-2030-et-portant-diverses-dispositions-interessant-la-defense.html
- French Senate: report no. 364 (2023-2024) by Dominique de Legge, financing of BITD companies (5 refusals out of 6 banks, ESG self-exclusion), senat.fr/rap/l23-364/l23-3642.html
- Idéal Investisseur: Guillou-Brassac market dialogue, April 2026 (€4-6bn equity need), ideal-investisseur.fr/eco-politique/defense-4-a-6-milliards-deuros-de-fonds-propres-manquent-a-la-bitd-dici-2030-33418.html
- Portail des Souverainetés: summary of the April 2026 government report (bank refusals based on financial soundness), portail-souverainetes.fr/index.php/2026/04/16/financement-de-la-bitd-rapport-gouvernemental-avril-2026
- GICAN: Economic report on the French naval industry in 2024, June 2025 edition (€15.9bn revenue, 735 companies), gican.asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Cahier-economique-de-lindustrie-navale-francaise-en-2024-17x239cm.pdf
- Le Journal des Entreprises: the French naval industry stays on course for growth (GICAN, 2025 data, €17bn revenue, 59,100 direct jobs, 4th-largest net job creator, July 2026), lejournaldesentreprises.com/article/lindustrie-navale-francaise-garde-le-cap-de-la-croissance-2146471
- ActuNautique: reindustrialising through the sea, the French naval industry’s winning bet (€38bn in orders in 2025, July 2026), actunautique.com/2026/07/reindustrialiser-par-la-mer-le-pari-gagnant-de-l-industrie-navale-francaise.html
- Usine Nouvelle: Naval Group booked €8 billion in orders in 2024 (revenue €4.3bn, order book €18.2bn, Barracuda contract with the Netherlands), usinenouvelle.com/article/naval-group-a-enregistre-8-milliards-d-euros-de-commande-en-2024.N2229681
- L’Essentiel de l’Éco: Naval Group, proof that France can still create industrial giants (2025 results, €18.9bn in order intake, €32bn order book), lessentieldeleco.fr/6496-naval-group-la-preuve-que-la-france-peut-encore-creer-des-geants-industriels
- French Ministry of the Economy (presse.economie.gouv.fr): publication of the AO10 specifications (merger of AO9/AO10, ~10 GW, target of 15 GW in operation in 2035), presse.economie.gouv.fr/le-gouvernement-annonce-la-publication-du-cahier-des-charges-de-lappel-doffres-n10-dit-ao10-pour-leolien-en-mer
- CRE: public consultation on RTE’s Ten-Year Network Development Plan, 2025 edition (€37bn, connection of 22 GW by 2040), cre.fr/actualites/toute-lactualite/la-cre-publie-sa-consultation-publique-relative-au-schema-decennal-de-developpement-du-reseau-de-rte-elabore-en-2025.html
- French Ministry for the Ecological Transition: Key figures on the sea and coastline, 2024 edition (Ifremer/Insee, €43.3bn in value added, 525,000 jobs, 1.5% of GDP, 2019 data), statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/edition-numerique/chiffres-cles-mer-littoral/9-economie-maritime
- Nouvelle Vie Pro: blue economy, 1 million jobs in maritime professions before 2030 (French Maritime Cluster, €70bn/400,000 current jobs, target €150bn/1 million jobs), nouvelleviepro.fr/economie-bleue-1-million-demplois-avant-2030-dans-les-metiers-du-maritime